HAIL TO THE CHIEF:
Expansion of Executive Power
by Karl Rove
Karl Rove is the former deputy chief of staff to President George W. Bush. He also has headed the Office of Political Affairs, the Office of Public Liaison and the Office of Strategic Initiatives in the White House.
The words "the nobility of public service" are more than a phrase. And if you've ever worked inside the White House and walked through those terrific gates onto the 18 acres, you understand the obligation of service. You also become aware of the tremendous burdens and challenges that any president faces on a daily basis. You gain a respect for those who have served and for those whose service is yet to come.
We all remember some of the harsh words shared between President George H.W. Bush and then-Governor Bill Clinton during the 1992 presidential contest. Yet those differences, which seemed so important at the time, faded, giving way to a mutual respect and tremendous good works-whether in helping with the tsunami relief in Indonesia or the revitalization of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
But this wasn't the first time this kind of relationship existed between political adversaries for America's highest office. The infamous presidential election of 1800 between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, for example, was one of the nastiest in our nation's history. One pro-Adams newspaper wrote that if Jefferson became president, "murder, robbery, rape, adultery, and incest will be openly taught and practiced, the air will be rent with the cries of the distressed, the soil will be soaked with blood, and the nation black with crimes."
Jefferson responded in kind, hiring James T. Callender to work at the Richmond Examiner, a Republican paper. Callender accused Adams of being mentally deranged, a "hideous hermaphroditical character, which has neither the force and firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman." After Jefferson won the election, he no longer funded Callender; and being an opportunist, Callender then went to work for The Recorder, Richmond's Federalist paper, where he revealed that Jefferson had subsidized his campaign against Adams. However, the two bitter political rivals (Adams and Jefferson) reconciled in a special moment in American history, and their relationship became one of the adhesives that kept the country together until their deaths on July 4, 1826, 50 years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence.
Working in the White House reminds you of these connections and deepens your appreciation for previous administrations. Every president owes a debt to his predecessors for strengthening the office and particularly for institutional changes that allow the White House to develop and implement policy and to cope with the demands of a faster-moving, more demanding and often more dangerous world. While the institution of the presidency is described succinctly in Article II of our Constitution, its structure, rhythm, form, function and strengths are the result of law and practice, executive action and necessity.
Executive Expansion
There are three enormously important modern changes to the presidency we now take for granted that were nonetheless groundbreaking when they were implemented: the legacies that three presidents-Harry S. Truman, Richard M. Nixon and Clinton-left their successors and all
future presidents.
During World War II, the planning efforts were so chaotic that in 1944, then-Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall advocated the unification of the Armed Forces into a single department under one civilian secretary. The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, opposed military unification but also recognized the need for greater policy coordination. As an alternative, he suggested the creation of an interdepartmental council much like the War Cabinet in Britain, proposing a civilian structure modeled on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Harry Truman, a friend of Marshall, sent a message to Congress in
December 1945, expressing his support for the creation
of a single Department of Defense.
President Truman's message, however, did not include Forrestal's idea of a coordinating body, fueling tensions between the Army and the Navy. Forrestal feared unification would give too much power to the Army and weaken the Navy. The infighting soon reached such a level that Truman called a meeting with Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Forrestal and ordered them to stop fighting, get together and come to agreement on a plan.
At President Truman's direction, Patterson and Forrestal reached a compromise and endorsed a plan, including the creation of a Security Council, which would integrate the Army and Navy departments into the National Military Establishment (NME). The NME was to be directed by the secretary of defense and would include civilian heads of the Armed Services (the Army, Navy and the newly established Air Force Division). Truman submitted the final draft of the bill to Congress, and in July 1947 the National Security Council (NSC) was created under the National Security Act.
In succeeding decades, by executive order and practice, the NSC assumed a vital role in coordinating international and security policy throughout the entire government. In the complex problem of what America does abroad-diplomatically, economically and militarily-a president no longer has to talk to Cabinet secretaries individually to arrive at policy decisions. Rather, he can coordinate policy through a single entity, which draws on diversity of opinion, while doing so within the constraints of a coordinating process.
The creation of the NSC was also important because it served as a model for future White House reforms. In 1968, Richard Nixon was elected president with a broad domestic agenda. But after reaching office, he realized he had few options within the White House that would allow him to develop, coordinate and implement domestic policy. He recruited Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a bright professor from Harvard University, as his urban affairs adviser but soon realized he needed more support. So in November 1969 he appointed John Ehrlichman as his chief domestic adviser to help coordinate domestic policy.
By March 1970, Nixon had put together an organizational plan based
on the work of Ehrlichman and the president's Advisory Council on
Executive Organization and submitted it to Congress. Among other things, the reorganization created the Domestic Policy Council (DPC). Modeled on the National Security Council, the DPC was designed to bring together Cabinet officials to discuss and coordinate domestic
policy. The DPC was formally chaired by the president and included every member of the Cabinet, except the Defense and State departments.
The Domestic Policy Council has become a vital component of the
White House structure used to coordinate and develop domestic policy and to strengthen the presidency and the president's domestic agenda. But even then it wasn't enough.
During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton promised that if elected, he would create an "Economic Security Council" modeled after the NSC. Shortly after President Clinton took office on Jan. 25, 1993, he issued an executive order establishing the National Economic Council (NEC) to coordinate both domestic and foreign economic policymaking to ensure policies were consistent with the president's agenda. This had been tried before by others-Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan had all established entities-but none had the power and the punch of the NEC.
President Clinton selected Robert Rubin as the first head of the NEC. Rubin established a collegial, consensus-building model and a process of coordinating policy that sought to avoid conflict with other governmental agencies. Consequently, he created a valuable office within the White House that was
instrumental in developing Clinton's
economic plan and has been equally
instrumental to the current president
(George W. Bush) in developing his.
The 21st Century President
The National Security Council, the Domestic Policy Council and the National Economic Council have improved the
focus, discipline and process of the
presidency-despite their absence from the
Constitution. Each institutional change has been vital to the success of the American presidency, in part because they have helped presidents deal with several large-scale changes in the nature of the federal
government. These changes are as follows:
First, the complexity of government. In 1930, government spending was equal to
3.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while today it's around 20 percent. The federal government spent less than
$10 billion in 1940 (equivalent to
$94 billion today) and is now spending more than $2 trillion a year. Furthermore, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in March 1933, the federal civil work force was less than 600,000 people. Today, the U.S. Postal Service alone employs more than 700,000 people.
Second, the growth of the executive
branch. When George Washington
took office in April 1789, he relied on administrative remnants from the Articles
of Confederation. His executive branch consisted of three people and their staffs: John Jay, superintendent of foreign affairs; Thomas Jefferson, minister to France;
and Henry Knox, superintendent of war.
In summer 1789, Congress provided
Washington five Cabinet members: secretary of war (Knox), secretary of state (Jefferson), secretary of the treasury (Alexander
Hamilton), attorney general (Edmund Randolph) and postmaster general
(Samuel Osgood). Today, there are
15 Cabinet secretaries and five other
Cabinet-rank officials.
Third, the increased need for speed and deliberation, particularly in foreign affairs. James Madison sent negotiators to Ghent, Belgium, where they signed the Treaty of Ghent on Dec. 24, 1814, to end the War of 1812. But the news took so long to reach the United States that no one in Louisiana knew about it when the Battle of New Orleans began on the morning of Jan. 8, 1815. Compare this to October 2006, when geological experts in the South Korean government alerted the U.S. government about a nuclear test in North Korea. American officials immediately began collecting information through satellite imagery, electronic intelligence and seismic readings, even before North Korea acknowledged it had conducted a test. Information passed instantaneously from one side of the globe to the other.
And, finally, the president's relationship with Congress. The relations between the first U.S. presidents and Congress were very much hands-off. In fact, the State of the Union wasn't delivered in person, but in a written message. Today, a president and Congress intersect every day in every way and every moment on every issue.
Conclusion
The institutional reforms put in place by Truman, Nixon and Clinton have extended the reach and the effectiveness of the presidency. Specifically, the National Security Council, Domestic Policy Council and National
Economic Council afford the president important new advantages and develop the institutional strength of the presidency. These organizational changes assure close and immediate advice. They help bring together the agencies that share responsibility and expertise in a particular policy arena. They provide a clear entry point for policy actors to engage with the White House. And they establish responsibility for policy development and implementation in specific areas.
Each U.S. president has been the recipient of a legacy left by his
predecessors. In a few instances, those legacies involved great challenges.
But all modern presidents have benefited from the thoughtful actions of
predecessors who strengthened the president's ability to receive clear advice, and to coordinate and deepen consultation with the other elements of government. These actions have made the office of the presidency stronger, more effective and more responsive to the needs of our time.
This piece was adapted from a speech given by Karl Rove on March 8, 2007,
at the Clinton School. |